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Abstract 
The enhanced Bayesian network (eBN) methodology described in the companion paper 
facilitates the assessment of reliability and risk of engineering systems when information 
about the system evolves in time. We present the application of the eBN (a) to the 
assessment of the life-cycle reliability of a structural system, (b) to the optimization of a 
decision on performing measurements in that structural system, and (c) to the risk 
assessment of an infrastructure system subject to natural hazards and deterioration of 
constituent structures. In all applications, observations of system performances or the 
hazards are made at various points in time and the eBN efficiently includes these 
observations in the analysis to provide an updated probabilistic model of the system at all 
times. 
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1 Introduction 
In the companion paper (Straub and Der Kiureghian, 2010), we introduced the enhanced 
Bayesian network (eBN) methodology to combine Bayesian networks (BNs) with 
structural reliability methods (SRMs). The eBN facilitates the assessment of reliability 
and risk of engineering systems, in particular when the information about the system 
evolves in time. This is especially relevant in a near-real-time decision-support system, 
which enables the identification of optimal actions in large and complex systems 
immediately after new information becomes available. Examples of such applications 
include natural hazard warning systems, optimization of post-hazard mitigation actions, 
and structural health monitoring and management.  
In this paper, we present the application of the eBN methodology to two example 
engineering systems, a structural system and an infrastructure system composed of 
structural systems. These are modified and extended versions of applications described in 
conference articles (Straub and Der Kiureghian, 2008 and 2009). In both examples, 
information on system elements and system performance, together with information on 
the hazards, become available over time, and are used to update the probabilistic models. 
The first example also demonstrates the facility of the proposed BN method for decision-
making. Particular emphasis is placed on accurate modeling of the statistical 
dependencies in the system models, which, as will be demonstrated, are especially 
relevant in the context of information updating.  
2 Reliability analysis and decision optimization of a structural 
system subject to environmental loading 
2.1 Basic model of the structural system 
Consider the structural system shown in Figure 1. This one-bay elasto-plastic frame 
under vertical load V and horizontal load H has been the subject of investigation by a 
number of authors following (Madsen et al., 1986). Here, the model is according to (Der 
Kiureghian, 2005). The structural system is defined by the plastic-moment capacities 
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1 2 5, , ,R R R  and the limit state functions corresponding to the three failure modes shown 
in Figure 1 are: 
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The event of structural failure is defined through the failure domain: 
    1,2,3min 0F ii g  x x  (2) 
Failure mechanisms:
1) sway mechanism
2) beam mechanism
3) combined mechanism
Structural model:
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Figure 1. Example ductile frame and its failure mechanisms. 
 
In the basic version of the problem, the plastic moment capacities 1 2 5, , ,R R R  are equi-
correlated Lognormal distributed random variables, with logarithmic mean R , 
logarithmic standard deviation R  and correlation coefficient 
2cov(ln , ln ) / ,lnR i j RR R i j   . The gravity load V and the environmental load H are 
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statistically independent random variables. The full probabilistic model for the basic case 
of this example is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Probabilistic model of example structural system (Der Kiureghian, 2005). 
Variable Distribution Mean c.o.v. Correlation 
Ri, i=1,...,5 [kNm] Joint Lognormal 150 0.2 0.3lnR   
H  [kN] Gumbel 50 0.4 Independent 
V  [kN] Gamma 60 0.2 Independent 
 
As a first step, we consider the classical reliability problem of determining 
)Pr()Pr( FF  X . In Figure 2, the corresponding eBN is shown. The variable E of 
this model represents the state of the system, i.e., either failure { }E F  or survival 
{ }E F occurs. In this formulation, we make use of the fact that the equi-correlation 
among the random variables 1 2 5, , ,R R R  can be modelled through a common parent 
variable UR with standard Normal distribution, such that 1 2 5, , ,R R R  are conditionally 
independent given UR = uR, with conditional distributions 
 
2
ln
, 1,...,5i R lnR Ri R
R
r u
F r u i
         
 (3) 
where   is the standard Normal cumulative distribution function (CDF). More generally, 
statistical dependence can be represented in this way among groups of random variables 
whose correlation matrix is of the Dunnet-Sobel class (Dunnett and Sobel, 1955).    
As observed in Figure 2, the only discrete variable in the eBN is the system state E. 
Therefore, reducing this network to the corresponding reduced BN (rBN), which consists 
only of the single variable E, is identical to directly solving the structural reliability 
problem for the probability of event F. Except for the graphical illustration of the model, 
nothing is gained from the eBN approach in this basic example.  
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Figure 2. The eBN model and the corresponding reduced rBN for the unconditional  
reliability problem. The shaded area is the Markov envelope. 
2.2 Reliability analysis with measurements of member capacities 
Since the eBN is powerful for Bayesian updating, we consider a case where information 
becomes available through in-situ, non-destructive measurements of the plastic moment 
capacities at locations 4 and 5. The measurements are indirect and associated with error, 
such that the resulting measurements are 
, 4,5i i iM R i     (4) 
with the i  being Normal distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 15 kNm. In the 
eBN model, the variables iM  are represented by discrete variables, since we expect to 
obtain evidence on these variables. A first (naïve) modelling approach is to simply 
discretize the variables 4 5,M M  and to construct the corresponding eBN as shown in 
Figure 3. The discretization follows the procedure described in the companion paper. The 
resulting rBN is presented on the right-hand side of Figure 3.  
The rBN shown in Figure 3 is not reflecting causality, since the measurements cannot 
influence the capacities (only our estimates of the capacities). This corresponds to a 
diagnostic model (Jensen, 2001). As discussed in the companion paper, causality is 
preferred, because it facilitates understanding and communication of the model, but also 
because it often leads to simpler calculations. This is the case here, as we show by 
introducing an alternative model. To maintain causality, the measured variables 4R  and 
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5R  must be included in the rBN. To this end, an alternative eBN model is established, 
wherein these variables are discretized in accordance to the method described in Section 
4 of the companion paper, as shown in Figure 4. Note that the resulting rBN maintains 
causality between the measured variables and the measurement outcomes. 
R5R1
UR
R3R2 R4
E
H
V E
M4 M5
M4 M5
eBN rBN
 
Figure 3. The eBN model and the corresponding rBN for the problem involving measurements of 
element capacities. 
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Figure 4. The alternative eBN model, with corresponding causal rBN,  
for the problem involving measurements of element capacities. 
As observed from the respective Markov envelopes, the first model (Figure 3) requires 
computation of 4 4 5 5Pr( | )F M m M m    through SRM, whereas the second model 
(Figure 4) requires computation of 4 4 5 5Pr( | )F R r R r    through SRM. The latter 
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computation corresponds to performing the unconditioned system reliability analysis 
whereby the random variables 4R  and 5R  are replaced with deterministic values 4r  and 
5r , which is simpler than directly solving for the conditional probability 
4 4 5 5Pr( | )F M m M m   , and might result in more accurate probability estimates. This 
model is utilized in the following.  Table 2 summarizes the results obtained with the 
eBN-rBN model, compared with results from Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) for 
verification. The reliability index in this table is computed as the standard normal variate 
for the complement of the failure probability. The conditional MCS results are obtained 
with the method proposed in (Straub 2011), which enables the computation of reliability 
conditional on measurements by means of simulation techniques. The eBN-rBN results 
are in agreement with the MCS results, as evident from Table 2. 
Table 2. Reliability index (failure probability) conditional on measurement results, 
4 4 5 5Pr( | )F M m M m   . For Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), the 95% probability interval 
is presented.  
Measurements [kNm]: No measurement M4=50, M5 =100 M4=150, M5 =100 M4=150, M5 =200 
eBN-rBN Model: 1.94 (2.6·10-2) 0.70 (0.24) 1.80 (3.6·10-2) 2.45 (0.71·10-2)  
MCS (106 samples): 1.93–1.94 0.63–0.77 1.78–1.81 2.44–2.48 
 
 
The above results are computed with discretization of R4 and R5 in 21 states with interval 
borders (50:10:250)kNm. Therefore, to establish the rBN, 212 = 441 SRM computations 
are required in the construction of the conditional probability mass matrix (PMF) of E. 
These are carried out by the First Order Reliability Method (FORM). Since these are 
straightforward series system reliability problems, the SRM computations are performed 
efficiently in an automated manner. The computer program CalREL (Der Kiureghian et 
al., 2006) is used for this purpose. The 21 values of the conditional PMF of each Mi given 
Ri=ri are obtained by use of Eq. (4) and the normal CDF. Once the rBN is established, the 
updating computations shown in Table 2 take negligible time. 
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2.3 Life-cycle reliability analysis with measurement of capacities 
and observations of past performances 
Let the environmental load H acting on the structure shown in Figure 1 vary with time. 
Since only the extreme load is of interest, we consider this temporal variability through 
the annual maximum load H(t) in any year t, t = 1, 2, …, 20, during the anticipated 20 
years service life of the structure. Although it is common to assume that the H(t) for 
different years are statistically independent of each other, this is not generally the case 
due to common influencing factors, such as model and statistical uncertainties, see, e.g., 
(Coles and Simiu, 2003). Modeling of such common factors is straightforward in the eBN 
approach. One simply formulates the H(t) conditional on the common influencing factors. 
To exemplify the accounting of this effect, we expand the model presented earlier by 
defining the parameter uH of the distribution of H(t), ( ) ( ) exp{ exp[ ( )]}H t H HF h h u    , 
as random variable UH. The gravitational load V is assumed to have only one realization 
during the service life of the structure. The corresponding eBN is presented in Figure 5, 
including the measurements M4 and M5 considered in the previous example. The links 
from E(t) to E(t+1) model the fact that a structure that has failed at time t remains in the 
failed state (no replacement or repair is assumed). The node E(t) thus represents the state 
of the structure up to time t. 
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R3R2 R4
E(1)
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M4 M5
R4a‘
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R5b‘
H(1) H(2) H(20)
UH
E(2) E(20)
 
Figure 5. A naïve eBN model for the life-cycle reliability analysis. 
Straub & Der Kiureghian (2010b)  9/31 
The eBN in Figure 5 is computationally inefficient. Because all performance variables 
E(1), …, E(20) are part of the same Markov envelope, establishing the corresponding 
rBN would require computation of the joint distribution of these variables. Furthermore, 
one variable E(t) would have all other performance variables as parents in the rBN. (See 
the case illustrated in Figure 7a of the companion paper.) To improve the model, we 
consider the modeling strategies presented in the companion paper. First, we note that, by 
discretizing the parent nodes of E(1), …, E(20), the latter can be modeled as statistically 
independent given their parent nodes. However, as observed from Figure 5, this would 
require discretization of R1, …, R5, UH and V, and SRM computations would be required 
for all combinations of the states of these discretized variables. To avoid this, we use the 
divorcing strategy presented in Section 4 of the companion paper. For this purpose, we 
introduce a continuous variable Q in the model, which represents the capacity of the 
structural system with respect to the environmental loads H(t). By discretizing this 
variable we achieve an efficient model of the structural system over its entire service life, 
as shown in Figure 6. In this model,  and the H(t)’s are discretized as well. While this 
is not required for computational efficiency, it is included in the model to enable updating 
when observations of past loads become available.  
The variable Q is discretized over a set of intervals. Let  denote the upper limit of the 
k-th interval. The CDF of the discretized variable Q is then obtained from the CDF of the 
corresponding continuous random variable at the upper limit of each interval. The latter is 
defined through the domain ( ) ( )kQ x  as 
   ( ) ( )Pr kQkQ q f d   x x x x   (5) 
The domain ( ) ( )kQ x  is obtained by replacing h in Equation (1) with kq  :  
 
 
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2 2 3 4
3 1 3 4 5
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x
 (6) 
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and 
    ( ) 1,2,3min , 0kQ Qi ki g q  x x  (7) 
The limit state function and the corresponding domain representing the failure of the 
structural system at time t then become 
   ( ) ,F tg q h t q h t     (8)
     (0)( ) ( ), , 0E t F tq h t g q h t          (9) 
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Figure 6. An efficient eBN model for the life-cycle reliability analysis,  
with the corresponding rBN. 
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For numerical evaluation, the same probabilistic model as earlier is employed, with the 
exception of modified distribution parameters for H(t): -10.0641kNH   and UH a 
Lognormal random variable with mean 35kN and standard deviation 10kN . (In the first 
example, H  was the same and =41.1kNHu .) The probabilistic model is summarized in 
Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.. 
Table 3. Probabilistic model of the structure with time-varying environmental load H(t).  
Variable Distribution Mean c.o.v. Correlation 
Ri, i=1,...,5 [kNm] Joint Lognormal 150 0.2 ln 0.3R   
i , i=4,5 [kNm] Normal 0 15 Independent 
V  [kN] Gamma 60 0.2 Independent 
UH [kN] Lognormal 35 0.286 Independent 
H(t), t=1,…,20  [kN]  Gumbel uH+9.0 20/(uH+9.0) Independent 
 
 
In Figure 7 we plot the reliability index of the structure as a function of time for different 
evidence cases. If the structure has survived the first five years, the reliability over the 
remaining years increases because (a) the probability of failure for the first five years is 
zero, and (b) the fact that the structure has withstood the loads in the first five years leads 
to a modified posterior distribution of the capacity (a proof-loading effect). In particular, 
the beam-failure mechanism, which only depends on the time-invariant vertical load, will 
not occur given that the structure has survived the first year. In the case where the 
environmental load in year 5 is additionally observed to be 80kN, the updated reliability 
is slightly lower than that without the observation of the load. This result is surprising at 
first sight, because the observation of survival to such a large load is expected to increase 
the proof-loading effect. However, because the loads H(t) are correlated due to the 
common model uncertainty in UH, observation of a large H(5) increases the posterior 
probability of large environmental loads in future years. Accordingly, if additional 
observations of low environmental loads, H(t)=30kN, are assumed to have been made in 
years  t=1,…,4, the resulting reliability indexes increase. To further demonstrate this 
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effect, the posterior distribution of UH is plotted in Figure 8 for these cases, showing a 
shift towards large values of uH for the observation in year 5 alone and a shift towards 
smaller values of uH for the observations in all 5 years.  
In Figure 9, observations of performance are considered together with capacity 
measurements. It is observed that the latter have a significant influence on the reliability 
index.  
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Figure 7. Reliability indexes computed for different evidence cases. 
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Figure 8. Posterior PDF of UH conditional on different evidence cases. 
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Figure 9. Reliability indexes computed for different evidence cases that include measurements of 
element capacities. 
The above results are computed with discretization of R4 and R5 in 21 states with interval 
borders (50:10:250)kNm and discretization of Q in 31 states with interval borders 
(0:5:150,∞)kN. Therefore, to establish the rBN, 221 31 = 19,251 SRM computations are 
required. Using FORM, these computations require approximately one CPU hour on a 
standard Pentium II computer. It is noted that the number of discrete states can likely be 
reduced without significant loss of accuracy, but no optimization was considered here, 
since, as in the first example, the employed FORM algorithm had no problem with the 
straightforward system reliability analyses. The conditional PMF of E given Q=q and 
Ht=ht is obtained through numerical integration, as is the conditional PMF of Ht given 
UH=uH. The discretization scheme of Ht is identical to that of Q with interval borders 
(0:5:150,∞)kN and the one for UH is (0:3:150,∞)kN. Once the rBN is established, 
computation of any of the curves shown in Figures 7-9 takes in the order of one CPU 
second on a standard Pentium II computer.  
2.4 Value of information analysis for capacity measurements 
This section illustrates the application of the eBN model to decision optimization. It 
makes use of the facility to extend any BN to a decision graph (aka influence diagram) by 
including decision and utility nodes (Shachter, 1986; Jensen, 2001). No introduction to 
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the theory of decision graphs is given here, but the provided description of its application 
is self-contained. 
We consider two decisions. The first is on the optimization of mitigation actions. Upon 
knowing the outcomes of the measurements, the owner of the structure, i.e., the decision-
maker, may decide to replace the elements of the structure if the measurement outcomes 
are unfavorable. The eBN can support the decision-maker in finding the optimal 
alternative. The second decision that is considered is on the measurements. Thus far we 
have assumed that measurements will be performed. However, at an earlier stage it has to 
be decided if and what to measure, depending on the cost of measurement. We employ 
the eBN extended to a decision graph to determine the benefit of the measurements, the 
so-called value-of-information, and whether the measurements should be performed in 
the first place. The first type of decision analysis is known as terminal analysis, the 
second as preposterior analysis (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961).  
The decision and utility nodes are included directly in the rBN, as shown in Figure 10. 
This graph includes a decision node (rectangular) for the replacement/no replacement 
decision; and two utility nodes (diamond-shaped), representing the cost of the 
replacement and the cost of failure of the structure. (This model assumes that the time of 
failure of the structure is immaterial. A more realistic model would have the utility node 
as a function of the failure events at different years to enable inclusion of discounting.)  
Q
R5R4
M4 M5
UH
Replace?
Rep. cost
Fail. costE(1) E(2) E(20)
H(1) H(2) H(20)
 
Figure 10. Decision graph based on the rBN in Figure 6. 
Straub & Der Kiureghian (2010b)  15/31 
A simple replacement model is selected: If the elements of the structure are replaced 
upon an unfavorable measurement, then the new structure is represented by the same 
stochastic model as the original structure. (In case of an unfavorable measurement, the 
decision-maker considers that a new draw from the same population is likely to produce a 
more favorable outcome.). In the rBN, the replacement model is represented by the PMF 
of Q, which must now be defined conditional on the replacement action. Given “no 
replacement” the PMF is identical to the one applied previously. Given “replacement”, 
the PMF of Q becomes statistically independent of R4 and R5, 
4 5( | , , ' replacement ') ( | ' replacement ')p q r r a p q a   , and corresponds to the PMF of Q 
for the original structure when no evidence is available.  
The utility nodes describe the consequences for given values of their parents. The utility 
node for the replacement cost takes the value  104 for the case of replacement and the 
value zero otherwise. The utility node for the failure cost takes the value 510  for the 
case of failure and the value zero otherwise.  
The decision optimization proceeds by computing the expected utility for the different 
decision alternatives. Many of the available BN inference software perform these 
calculations; otherwise, the rBN provides the conditional PMF’s required for the 
evaluation of the expected utility. For the first decision problem, the expected utilities for 
the two decision alternatives (“replace” and “do not replace”) are shown in Table 4 for 
several evidence cases.  
Table 4. Expected utilities for the decision alternatives “replace” and “do not replace” for 
different evidence cases. Bold numbers indicate optimal decisions.  
Evidence                             Expected utility for “do not replace” Expected utility for “replace” 
a) No evidence –23,276 –23'276 + –10'000 = –33,276 
b) m4 = 120kNm, m5 = 120kNm –44,087 –23'276 + –10'000 = –33,276 
c) m4 = 180kNm, m5 = 180kNm –7,936 –23'276 + –10'000 = –33,276 
d) m4 = 100kNm, survival up to t=5yr –32,191 –19'421 + –10'000 = –29,421 
e) m4 = 100kNm, survival up to t=10yr –20,814 –14'798 + –10'000 = –24,798 
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As expected, nothing is gained from replacement in the no-evidence case (a), since in this 
case the new structure is described by the same stochastic model as the original one. In 
case of the unfavorable measurement outcomes (b), the replace decision is the optimal 
one. In case of the favorable outcomes (c), no replacement should be performed. In case 
(d), where an unfavorable measurement result is obtained in year 5, the structure should 
be replaced, despite the fact that it did not fail up to this time. In case (e), where the same 
measurement result is obtained in year 10, the optimal decision is not to replace. In this 
case, the proof-loading effect and the fact that the remaining service life is only 10 years 
are in favor of the “do not replace” option. 
To determine whether either measurement should be conducted, we perform a value-of-
information (VOI) analysis. In this analysis, the rBN is used to compute the optimal 
terminal decision and the associated expected utility conditional on all possible outcomes 
of each considered measurement, ]|E[ jMU i  . To obtain the expected utility prior to 
knowing the measurement outcome, but given that the measurement will be performed, 
the expectation with respect to each Mi is computed: 
     E | E | Pri i i
j
U a U M j M j    (10)
 
where ia denotes the decision to perform measurement i and Pr[Mi = j] is the prior 
probability of Mi being in state j. In Equation (10), the cost of the measurement itself is 
not included. The VOI of ia  is computed as the difference between the expected utility 
given ia  and the expected utility when no measurement is conducted: 
     E | Ei iVOI a U a U   (11)
 Some BN inference software perform these calculations directly, e.g., the free GeNIe BN 
modeling environment developed by the Decision Systems Laboratory of the University 
of Pittsburgh.  
For the present example, the results for the individual measurements are 4( ) 1,802VOI a   
and 5( ) 1,168VOI a   of utility units. This shows that more information is gained by 
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measuring capacity R4, since this variable has a higher importance, as is evident from the 
limit state functions defining the system failure, Eq. (1). (Note that r4 appears in all three 
limit-state functions and it has a coefficient of 2 in g3, while r5 appears only in g1 and g3, 
both with coefficients 1.) The two measurements are not independent, and to determine 
whether both should be performed, it is necessary to also compute the joint VOI of the 
two measurements. Here, we obtain 4 5( , ) 2,763VOI a a  units. If the cost of a 
measurement is lower than its VOI, it is beneficial to perform it. As an example, if one 
measurement costs 500 units, then both measurements should be performed. If one 
measurement costs 1,500 units of utility, then only measurement a4 should be performed, 
since its VOI is 1,802 and the VOI of both measurements is only 961 ( 2763 1802  ) 
units higher. Therefore, the second measurement would not be cost effective in that case. 
3 Reliability analysis of an infrastructure system subject to 
environmental loading and deterioration 
This example demonstrates the relevance of the eBN methodology for reliability and risk 
assessment of infrastructure systems, which are comprised of structural and non-
structural systems. Examples of structural systems that are part of infrastructure systems 
are bridges and tunnels that are elements of transportation systems, and offshore 
platforms and pipelines that are elements of an oil and gas production system; examples 
of non-structural elements in these systems are power supply units, pumping stations or 
traffic control systems. In principle, the eBN might also include models of the related 
organizational and behavioral aspects, such as the reaction of personnel or the public to 
extreme events, but this is not considered here.   
Assessment of infrastructure system performance and risk must account for both the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of the problem. In the temporal dimension, the analysis 
must include accounting for: 
 temporal statistical dependence of hazards (as considered in the previous 
example); 
 deterioration of structural and non-structural elements; 
Straub & Der Kiureghian (2010b)  18/31 
 discounting.  
In the spatial dimension, the analysis must include accounting for: 
 spatial distribution of the hazard (demand); 
 spatial distribution of the system capacities;  
 network system functionality. 
These temporal and spatial aspects determine the dependences among the system 
elements. eBNs and corresponding decision graphs are well suited for efficiently 
modeling these system dependences. However, the particular advantage of the eBNs is 
that they facilitate updating of the uncertainties in the system model based on 
observations at any scale of the system. For example, monitoring of a structural 
component in a bridge can be utilized to update the probabilistic model of the entire 
infrastructure. Such multi-scale system analysis is possible because the eBN framework 
enables inclusion of structural reliability methods in a general BN model of an 
infrastructure system.  
3.1 Object-oriented BN 
To facilitate establishing and representing the eBN and the corresponding rBN models for 
infrastructure systems, we make use of object-oriented BNs (OOBNs) (Koller and Pfeffer, 
1997). In an OOBN, a class is a Bayesian network in which some of the variables are 
defined as input and some as output (the attributes of the class). The instantiations of the 
classes (the objects) are embedded in a higher level BN, with which they communicate 
through input and output variables. The OOBN methodology includes the general 
concepts of object-oriented programming, such as inheritance from a class to a subclass. 
However, for the purpose of the considered application, it is sufficient to think of the 
OOBN as a BN in which sets of variables are grouped into objects, which are either a part 
of other, higher-level objects or directly of the top-level model. To perform inference, the 
OOBN is treated like a large BN. This concept, which is quite intuitive, is illustrated in 
Figure 11, in which rounded rectangles represent objects. As an example, the typical 
“bridge” object is connected through its input variable “spectral acceleration,” which is 
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an output variable of the “earthquake characteristics” object, and its output variable 
“performance,” which is an input variable to the “transportation system” object.  
Earthquake 
source
Bridge 1 Bridge 2 Bridge 3
Transporation
system
Earthquake 
characteristics
site 1
Earthquake 
characteristics
site 3
Earthquake 
characteristics
site 2
Bridge i Spectral 
acceleration
Performance
Bridge type
Bridge age
Bridge
condition
Input variable
Output variable  
Figure 11. Illustration of the OOBN concept, considering an example of a  
transportation network with three bridges subject to earthquakes. 
3.2 eBN-based framework for infrastructure risk analysis 
A generic OOBN model framework for infrastructure systems is presented in Figure 12. 
The horizontal and vertical directions of the model respectively describe the temporal and 
spatial dimensions of the problem. All nodes are objects (thus their rounded rectangular 
shapes), i.e., they generally represent lower-level BNs. Each object can contain both 
continuous and discrete variables, in which case it is an eBN, or only discrete variables, 
in which case it is a BN.  
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Figure 12. A spatial-temporal eBN model framework for infrastructure systems. 
The framework includes objects that represent relevant natural hazard phenomena. These 
objects describe the general characteristics of the hazards for the considered region. They 
have as children instantiations of the hazard classes, each of which models a particular 
instance of a hazard at time ti (e.g., a particular windstorm or earthquake event) at the 
regional level. Next, the framework includes objects Qj that represent the time-invariant 
characteristics of the infrastructure elements, such as bridges and tunnels. If Qj is the 
capacity of a structural system, and if that system is subject to deterioration, then objects 
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Qj(ti) are introduced to model the capacity as a function of time. The performance of each 
system element j at time ti is modeled by an object Ej(ti) that includes the local hazard 
characteristics, such as the spectral acceleration at the site due to an earthquake or the 
local wind speed due to a regional windstorm. Finally, the performance of the 
infrastructure system is modeled by the object Esys(t), which represents the system 
functionalities, e.g., the possibility of travel between certain origin-destination nodes. 
The suggested framework makes certain assumptions about conditional independence 
among the elements of the model. For example, performances of different infrastructure 
elements are assumed to be statistically independent for given hazard and unknown 
infrastructure system performance, and deterioration of elements is modeled as a 
Markovian process. However, as shown in (Straub 2009) for the case of deterioration, 
these assumptions do not represent strict limitations on the model, since the independence 
assumption can be circumvented by adding additional variables. Therefore, the above 
framework is considered sufficiently general for most types of infrastructure systems and 
hazards. The approach, however, does have limitations from the viewpoint of 
computability. These stem from the need to limit the sizes of the Markov envelopes in the 
eBN and the requirement to limit the complexity of the resulting rBN. Below, we briefly 
describe strategies to deal with these computational limitations. The implications of these 
limitations on the applicability of the model for realistic infrastructure systems is 
discussed later, following the example. 
First, regarding the sizes of the Markov envelopes, to the extent possible these should be 
confined to the individual objects of the general framework. A general modeling strategy 
to achieve this objective is to discretize any of the input and output variables of the 
framework objects that are of continuous type. The method described in Section 3.8 of 
the companion paper can be used for this purpose. Second, to limit the complexity of the 
resulting rBN, the number of input and output variables of each object in the general 
framework, as well as the number of states of these variables, should be made as small as 
possible. Here, the modeler must find a balance between accuracy and efficiency of the 
model. The modeling strategies introduced in the companion paper and demonstrated for 
the first example of this paper can be helpful in achieving this goal. Third, like any 
engineering model, an eBN model should be targeted towards specific decision problems. 
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In doing so, those parts of the general framework that are immaterial to the particular 
decision problem can be omitted. Furthermore, the number of states of the discrete 
variables, which determine the accuracy of the model, should be selected in 
correspondence with the accuracy of the available information and the relevance of the 
variable to the decision problem at hand. 
3.3 Example infrastructure reliability and risk analysis 
Consider the simplified train transportation system illustrated in Figure 13. The 
rectangles in this network represent structural elements (bridges), the squares represent 
non-structural elements (control systems), and the lines represent railways. At time t, 
each of the structural and non-structural elements in the system is either in the survival 
state, Ej(t)=1, in which case the corresponding link is connected, or in a failed state 
Ej(t)=0, in which case the corresponding link is disconnected. The railway segments are 
always in the working state. The performance of the system at any given time t is defined 
as a binary variable: Esys(t) = 1 if there is connectivity between cities A and B, and Esys(t) 
= 0 otherwise. 
1 2 311
12
A B
13
11
1 Structures
Control systems
A Cities
Railway
 
Figure 13. Example transportation system. 
To simplify the presentation, we assume that all structural systems in our infrastructure 
are represented by the idealized structural model of the first example, as shown in Figure 
1, and that the probabilistic description is as in Table 1. Inclusion of different models for 
different structures would be straightforward and would not increase the computational 
effort, but would require providing additional details. The system is subject to an 
environmental hazard (e.g., windstorm, earthquake), which at the level of structure j is 
modeled by the variable Hj(t) that is defined conditional on the regional hazard 
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characteristics H(t) as ( ) ( ) ( )j jH t H t X t  . Here, ( )jX t  represents the effect of the local 
site conditions. In a real application, ( )jX t  would be replaced by functions that depend 
on the site location and hazard characteristics (e.g. attenuation models for the case of 
earthquakes), but conceptually the model remains the same, and so do the associated 
computational efforts. An exception is the case where ( )jX t  for different sites are 
statistically dependent, such as is the case for spatially correlated error terms in 
earthquake attenuation models (Straub et al., 2008). Deterioration is introduced in the 
model through the conditional PMF of the capacity of the structure at time t, 
Pr[ ( ) ( ) | ( 1) ( 1)]j j j jQ t q t Q t q t    . Any Markovian deterioration model can be 
represented in this form. For the present example we assume that the capacity at any time 
step t is Beta distributed in the interval [0, ( 1)jq t  ], with mean value 0.98 ( 1)jq t   and 
standard deviation 0.01 ( 1)jq t  .   
All non-structural elements in the system are of the same type. For the element at site j, 
the failure probability conditional on the local hazard intensity, ( )jH t , is given through a 
Lognormal fragility function  Pr[ ( ) | ( )] {[ln ( ) ] / }j j j j jF t h t h t      with parameters j  
and j . The non-structural elements do not deteriorate and their capacities remain 
invariant of time. 
The full probabilistic model of the infrastructure system is summarized in Table 5. The 
objects of the eBN model of the infrastructure are shown in Figure 14. The infrastructure 
performance is modeled using the “explicit connectivity” approach described in (Bensi et 
al., 2009). Unlike the life-cycle example for the single structural system, the variables 
Ej(t) here are defined as the performances of the infrastructure elements in year t, not the 
performances up to year t. This model is more appropriate if the interest is in the 
reliability of the infrastructure system, since it is realistic to assume that a failed system 
element would be immediately replaced. However, in order to account for implicit proof-
loading effects, the reliability in year t must be computed conditional on survival up to 
year t1.   
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Table 5. Probabilistic model for the infrastructure example.  
Variable Distribution Mean c.o.v.  
Rji, i=1,...,5, j=1,2,3 [kNm] Joint Lognormal 150 0.2  
ji , i=4,5, j=1,2,3 [kNm] Normal 0 15  
V  [kN] Gamma 60 0.2  
UH [kN] Lognormal 35 0.286  
H(t), t=1,…,10  [kN] Gumbel uH+9.0 20/(uH+9.0)  
Qj(t), j=1,2,3, t=2,…,10 Beta in [0, qj(t–1)] 0.98qj(t–1) 1/98  
Xj(t), j=1,2,3, t=1,…,10 Lognormal 0.8 0.1  
j , j=11,12,13 Deterministic 4.76 
j , j=11,12,13 Deterministic 0.246  
The logarithms of the moment capacities ijR  and kjR  within a structure j are correlated with 0.3lnR  . 
Structure j
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Figure 14. eBN for the example infrastructure. The objects are connected through their  
input and output nodes in accordance with the general framework in Figure 12. 
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To demonstrate the potential of the eBN framework as a tool for near-real-time 
infrastructure risk assessment, the model is applied to determine the reliability of the 
network as a function of time with varying observations. Exemplarily, the sequence of 
observations summarized in Table 6 is considered. The analysis starts with the a-priori 
case (a) that corresponds to the information available during the design phase. After 
construction of the infrastructure, measurements of the capacities of the structural 
elements are made, step (b). Thereafter, in the first two years of service, relatively low 
environmental loads are observed, together with the performance of the system elements, 
steps (c) and (d). In the third year, an extreme hazard event occurs. During the event, the 
only available information is that the hazard intensity is above a certain level, step (e). 
(For certain hazards, e.g., windstorms, predictions of H could also be included prior to 
the event.) Immediately after the event, the available information is still incomplete and 
only the performances of two system elements are known, step (f). Finally, in the 
aftermath of the hazard event, the performance of the entire system and the exact hazard 
intensity become known, step (g).  
Table 6. Sequence of observations in the infrastructure system example.  
Additional observations Evidence entered in the rBN  
(a) No observations (a-priori model) No observation 
(b) Measurements of capacity Mj4=180kN, j = 1,2,3 
(c) Performance and hazard first year H(1)=40kN; Ei(1)=1, 
i=1,2,3,11,12,13. 
(d) Performance and hazard second year H(2)=35kN; 
Ei(2)=1, i=1,2,3,11,12,13. 
(e) Hazard third year H(3)>70kN. 
(f) Performance of system elements  E3(3)=1; E13(3)=1. 
(g)  Performance and hazard third year H(3)=85kN; Ei(3)=1, i=1,2,3,11,12,13.  
 
The updated system reliability for all observation steps is presented in Figure 15 for a 10 
year life span. Also, as a representative example, the updated reliability of structure 1 is 
presented in Figure 16. The values shown here are the reliability indexes corresponding 
to the probability of failure in a given year, consistent with the definition of Ej(t).  
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At step (a), the unconditional system reliability slightly decreases with time due to the 
deterioration of the structural systems, which leads to a decreased capacity with respect to 
extreme environmental loads. At step (b), inclusion of the favorable information gained 
from the measurement of the capacities of the structural elements significantly increases 
the reliability of the infrastructure as well as each of the structures. The measurement 
results considered here are above the expected value of the capacities, but the difference 
is less than the combined standard deviation of the capacities and the measurement 
uncertainty. The observation of good performance in the first year (step c) slightly 
increases the reliability, due to a proof-loading effect with respect to the beam 
mechanism of the structural systems, as seen earlier in the life-cycle example. Because 
the observed environmental load value is low, there is no proof-loading effect related to 
the failure mechanisms involving the environmental loads. This is confirmed by the fact 
that inclusion of the information in step (d) has virtually no effect on the estimated 
reliabilities.  
In step (e), only the immediate reliability index is of interest. The near-real-time 
availability of this assessment can provide crucial information to the emergency response 
personnel. This and step (f) demonstrate that any information becoming available during 
and in the immediate aftermath of a hazard event can be accounted for by the model. In 
the latter step, observation of survival of two system components leads to an increased 
reliability of the system. Finally, step (g) illustrates that after the event, and given that the 
entire infrastructure performed well, the reliability index is close to the one prior to the 
event. The small reduction in reliability is due to the model uncertainty on the 
environmental loading, represented by UH, which causes dependence among the hazard 
events in different years. Observing a large value for H(3) increases the probability of 
large hazards in future years. 
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Figure 15. Reliability index of the infrastructure system conditional on the sequence of observations. 
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Figure 16. Reliability of structure 1 conditional on the sequence of observations. 
The rBN enables the updating of all variables in the system, and thus facilitates learning 
about the model. To demonstrate this, we present in Figure 17 the posterior PDF of UH, 
the variable representing the uncertainty in the model of the environmental load, for the 
sequence of relevant observations. The difference between the PDFs for steps (d) and (g) 
reflects the effect of observing a large hazard in year 3. 
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Figure 17. The PDF of UH conditional on sequence of observations. 
4 Discussion 
The presented examples illustrate the capabilities and potential of the eBN approach for 
reliability analysis of structures and infrastructure systems. From the viewpoint of 
application to decision support and optimization in near-real-time, where information 
becomes available gradually over time, a particular benefit is the possibility to apply 
exact inference algorithms for the analysis of the rBN. These algorithms are 
computationally efficient and robust, as long as the resulting rBN is not too complex. It is 
important to be aware of this limitation in the application and further development of the 
methodology. 
As pointed out earlier, the sizes of the Markov envelopes in the eBN must be restricted. 
In the presented examples, this objective was achieved through the strategies suggested in 
the companion paper, in particular by selectively discretizing some of the continuous 
random variables and by introducing additional variables to reduce the number of parents 
to the discrete variables. The presented models can be further extended and larger (and 
more realistic) structural models and infrastructure systems can be considered. However, 
it is noted that certain extensions of the model require further development before being 
computationally feasible. For example, in the presented applications, the structural 
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systems were modeled in detail at time zero, but were represented by single variables Qj(t) 
at later times. This choice was made to reduce the sizes of the Markov envelopes, but it 
does not allow detailed modeling of the deterioration of individual structural elements, 
and it does not enable direct inclusion of measurements and inspections of the elements 
of the structural systems at times t > 0. Additionally, when a structural system is 
subjected to different types of hazards, then Qj(t) must represent the capacity of the 
structure with respect to the joint effect of these hazards. Further work is required to 
determine an efficient representation in this case.  
Furthermore, the computational complexity of the resulting rBN evaluations must be 
contained. Because the evaluations require the computation of the joint probability of the 
evidence (Straub and Der Kiureghian, 2010), the complexity depends on the evidence. 
All cases presented in this paper were computed efficiently, but, for the infrastructure 
analysis, combinations of evidence can be conceived for which the evaluation becomes 
too demanding for exact inference algorithms. This is the case, for example, when the 
performances of many infrastructure system elements at different times are observed 
without observing the related joint hazard. Although this case is not typical, strategies for 
dealing with such situations should be developed in the future. A potential solution is to 
switch to approximate inference algorithms in such cases, or use combinations of 
approximate and exact inference algorithms.    
Finally, it is pointed out that many documented applications of structural reliability 
methods make use of ideas and concepts incorporated in the proposed eBN framework. In 
particular, for simple reliability analysis, the modeling underlying the eBN is quite 
intuitive. In these cases, the benefit of the eBN is that it represents a rigorous framework 
that supports the establishment, documentation and quality control of the models. 
Additionally, and this is arguably its most important benefit, the eBN facilitates the 
extension of simple structural reliability models to models with complex dependence 
structures and to decision graphs that support the optimization of mitigation actions under 
evolving information.  
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper, the eBN methodology developed in the companion paper is successfully 
applied to time-varying reliability analysis of a single structural system and an 
infrastructure system composed of structural and nonstructural elements. The first 
example demonstrates how information obtained during the life-cycle of the structure 
from measurements of element capacities and from observations of past and current 
hazard events can be used to make optimal decisions regarding repair or replacement of 
the structure. The second example demonstrates how information gained during the life 
of an entire infrastructure system can be used to probabilistically update our state of 
knowledge about the future performance of the infrastructure and its elements. These 
calculations are performed through Bayesian updating in a computationally robust and 
efficient manner. The examples also illustrate the capabilities of the eBN to represent and 
account for various degrees of statistical and logical dependences in the models.  
The presented methodology opens a new direction for research and development by 
combining tools from two well-developed methodologies:  structural reliability methods, 
and BN combined with decision graphs. The methodology combines the computational 
power of SRMs for continuous variables, and powerful inference algorithms of BN for 
discrete variables. However, as discussed in the preceding section, additional work is 
needed to overcome both modeling and computational hurdles in order to solve more 
general and realistic structural and infrastructure systems under varying degrees of 
information. We hope this work will spark interest for additional research in this direction. 
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